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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
AND CROSS-DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT DUNAHOO 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents herein believe that appellants' statement 
of the case is incorrect on a number of important particulars. 
These areas of dispute on the facts will be discussed each in 
turn. 
It is alleged by appellants on pages 5 and 6 of their 
brief, and they would lead the Court to believe, that the 
officers of Fiber Science were planning on purchasing the 
property in question totally by themselves. Their brief states 
that: 
However, Mr. Dunahoo and several of his vice 
presidents, the Fiber Science's group, determined that 
they, in their individual capacities, wished to 
purchase the property and in turn lease it to 
Fiber-Sciences. 
{Appellants' Brief p. 5). 
The brief also speaks of "the desire of the officers 
of Fiber-Sciences to own the Property," (Appellant Brief p. 6) 
and "Fiber-Sciences determined to purchase, not lease, the 
Property from Lowenberg." (Appellant Brief p. 6). The 
transcript cited by appellants in support of those allegations, 
however makes it very clear that the contemplation from the 
very beginning for all parties was that Respondent Dunahoo and 
some of his vice presidents in Fiber Science, Inc. were 
interested only in participating in the ownership of the 
property. It was never expected that they by themselves would 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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own the property, if for no other reason that they did not have 
the financial capacity to own any more than twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the property in question. For example, respondent 
Dunahoo te~tified as follows in answer to questioning from 
appellants' counsel: 
Q. All right. Consider your financial status at the 
time, and those that you were contemplating 
participating, did you have an idea of what your 
capability of participation would be? 
A. It appeared to be approximately 25 percent. 
Q. All right. Now, you were the president of Fiber 
Science at this time, as you've earlier 
testified. What made you believe that you could 
participate in the ownership of the building that 
was being leased to your own company? 
A. My understanding of the corporate policy was if 
it were an arms-length deal that it would be 
satisfactory to be involved in such an 
attange:nent. 
Q, Did you believe that this was an arms-length deal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On what basis? 
A. Because we had negotiated a lease with Cerritos 
Trucking that was less than was being requested 
for the building originally. 
(Tr. pp. 143-144). 
Q. The question was: Did you ever attempt to lease 
that property from Bill Lowenberg? 
A. No, we did not. 
Q. All right. You were in the market to lease 
property? 
A. That's correct. 
Q, You determined that you would rather buy it? 
-2-
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A. It was determined that if we could be involved in 
it, we would rather have Cerritos buy it so we 
could be involved in that investment. 
(Tr, pp. 150-151) 
At no time was it ever represented to appellants or to 
the real estate agent Daughtrey by plaintiffs-respondents or by 
cross Defendant-Respondent Dunahoo that Dunahoo and the Fiber 
science vice presidents would own all of the property in 
question. In fact of the matter, once the building in question 
was selected, no one from Fiber Science was directly involved 
with the negotiations on the purchase of the same. (Tr. pp. 
111-112; testimony of Daughtrey; Tr. pp. 154-155; testimony of 
Dunahoo; Tr. pp. 69-70; testimony of Heimark.) 
It is also alleged by appellants that the proposal 
given to Mr. Lowenberg was that Fiber Science, Inc. would lease 
the property in question only if an option to purchase the 
property was granted to "the Fiber-Sciences group" (identified 
in the brief as Respondent Dunahoo and several of his vice 
presidents). (Appellant Brief pp. 5-6.) The actual fact is 
that no such contingent offer was made. (Tr. 207; testimony of 
Daughtrey.) The only offer to purchase brought by Daughtrey to 
Lowenberg were from Respondents Heimark and Fleming and not 
from the Fiber Science people. (Tr. pp. 130-131; testimony of 
Daughtrey. ) 
It is alleged in the· appellants' brief on page B that 
Appellant Lowenberg heard rumors sometime in late January or 
early February of 1979 that Fiber Science people would not own 
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the building. The evidence as to that point is clear that on 
or around January 26, 1979, at a meeting at which Daughtrey, 
Heimark and Dunahoo along with appellant Lowenberg were in 
attendance, and that Lowenberg was explicitly told that the 
Fiber Science people were not able to participate in the 
purchase of the building in question. (Tr. #pp. 145-146; 
testimony of Dunahoo; Tr. pp. 211-212; testimony of 
Daughtrey.) Despite having learned in January 1979, of the 
inability of the Fiber Science people to participate in the 
purchase, it was not until April 1979 or at the earliest late 
March, 1979, that the notice of recission (Ex. SP) was sent. 
(Tr. p. 223; testimony of Lowenberg.) It is also of importance 
to the factual context of this case that it be noted that on 
February 28. 1979, i.e., almost exactly one month after the 
discussion in which appellant was told that the Fiber Science 
people would not participate in the purchase, that 
plaintiffs-respondents paid into an escrow the full amount of 
the purchase price. On that occasion appellants, represented 
by legal counsel, put into the same escrow a warranty deed 
representing the transfer of the property to plaintiffs-respon-
dents. (Ex. 7P.) 
Although there are other areas where respondents would 
dispute the correctness of the facts as alleged by appelants, 
perhaps respondents' position can best be summed up by 
directing this Court to the Findings of Fact signed by the 
lower court and on file herein. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS DID NOT SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING 
MISREPRESENTATION 
Repeatedly throughout the appellants' brief the 
allegation is made that because there are some disputed facts, 
it was error that the case was not submitted to the jury. That 
this is not the case is clear from the very cases cited by 
appellants in support of their own position. See, e.g., 
Boskovich v. Utah Const. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 
(1953). There the court held that "where there is no evidence 
upon a material part of the plaintiff's claim, it is the 
court's duty to direct a verdict." 259 P.2d at 886. 
Likewise, in other cases cited by the appellants, this 
Court has held that a directed verdict is proper where there is 
no "substantial" contradictory or disputed evidence. L. w. 
Flynn v. w. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 590 P.2d 356 (Utah 1973); 
Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 240, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). In 
other words, the fact that appellant Lowenberg at the time of 
trial attempted to contravene the corroborated testimony of 
respondents by making uncorroborated self-serving statements is 
not sufficient to have the matter go to the jury. First, the 
testimony has to be sufficient that reasonable minds could 
differ. Second, that evidence has to go to substantive 
items. Third, appellants have to establish their entire case 
and not simply have a dispute on the evidence on part of their 
case. 
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As discussed herein, it is the contention of 
respondents that as to material items claimed to be in dispute, 
reasonable minds could .not differ from the ruling reached by 
the trial court on the basis of the evidenc~ presented. ~s to 
those items for which there is any real dispute, such items 
were not substantive and were only peripheral. In addition, 
most of the critical elements of the claims under which 
appellants were proceeding were never established in their 
favor, even taking the evidence in a light most favorable to 
them. 
Appellants' brief very nicely lays out the elements 
which appellants needed to establish before they could receive 
a verdict in their favor on the claim of misrepresentation, 
which is really the only claim brought by them before this 
Court. On each point the only evidence, if it can be called 
such, presented by appellants were the self-serving statements 
of appellant Lowenberg. There was no corroboration by any of 
the other witnesses. In fact, the conduct and actions of 
appellant Lowenberg, as verified by his own testimony, speaks 
against him. Moreover, appellants failed to present any 
evidence at all in their favor regarding some of the critical 
elements of their claim. Thus, the lower court was quite 
justified in determining as it did that appellants had not 
proven a cause of action sounding in fraud or misrepresentation. 
-6-
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A· No Evidence of a Misrepresentation. 
Appellants claim that there was a misrepresentation of 
a material fact. The misrepresentation they rely on is a claim 
that appellant Lowenberg was told by Daughtrey, the real estate 
agent employed by respondent Bettilyon, that the Fiber Science 
people wanted to buy the property in question and that unless 
they could purchase the property, Fiber Science, Inc. would not 
lease the building. Appellant Lowenberg claims that except for 
that representation, he never would have considered selling the 
property to anyone. He further claims that he was motivated to 
sell the building to the officers of Fiber Science in order to 
win the good graces and further business as a tenant of Fiber 
Science, Inc. 
It is readily apparent that the very claim made by 
appellants on appeal is contradictory. The one claimed basis 
for relief implies a certain blackmail or coersion to sell the 
building. The second indicates a readiness to sell the 
building in order to promote goodwill but that the intended 
beneficiaries did not receive the benefit intended. Despite 
that anomaly, both assertions are rested on the basic and 
underlying claim that the Fiber Science people would, in fact, 
be the purchasers of the building in question. 
If the record is devoid of evidence either that the 
representation as stated was not in fact made by these 
respondents, or that, if made, was not false at the time it was 
made, then appellants' cause of action fails for having failed 
-7-
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to establish the most fundamental aspect of their entire case, 
namely a misrepresentation. This court has in fact even stated 
it stronger, requiring in Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 
Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967) that the one making the 
representation must either intentionally misstate the facts 
(which is really an action in fraud), or else have "a pecuniary 
interest in a transaction, [be] in a superior position to know 
material facts, and carelessly or negligently [make] a false 
representation concerning them " 423 P.2d at 662. 
Appellant Lowenberg testified that he was not a close 
personal friend of respondent Dunnahoo prior to the signing of 
the lease and option on April 28, 1978. (Tr. p. 221; testimony 
of Lowenberg.) Appellant Lowenberg also testified under 
examination by his own counsel that he did not know the names 
of the other officers of Fiber Science whom he expected to 
benefit: 
Q. Now, at that time did you know the names of the 
officers of Fiber Science? 
A. I had only met two officers of Fiber Science. 
Q, Did you intend to allow them, the officers of 
Fiber Science, to have this concession because 
they were friends of yours? 
A. No, they were not friends. 
Q. It was because of business consideration? 
A. Business consideration. 
(Tr. 217; testimony of Lowenberg.) 
In short, Lowenberg's testimony is that based on a 
one-time meeting with Dunahoo and one other officer of Fiber 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
science, he was induced to give a valuable concession to people 
he did not know, even by name, as a good business manueuver. 
Futher he claims that he would not have made the concession had 
he known that the said individuals from Fiber Science (whom he 
did not know) were not going to participate and that the 
partners of Cerritos Associates, (whom he claims he also did 
not know), were in fact going to be the ultimate purchasers. 
It is also interesting to note from appellant Lowenberg's own 
testimony that he did not even tell the Fiber Science people 
they were getting a benefit or a concession. 
Q. Mr. Lowenberg, isn't it true that you -- that 
prior to -- or, prior to April 28, 1978, you had 
no written agreement with the Fiber Science 
people showing any participation in the purchase 
of the property in question? 
A.. That's correct. 
Q. And it just as true, Mr. Lowenberg, that you 
never told anyone from Fiber Science prior to 
April 28, 1978, that you were giving them a good 
deal? 
A. I never discussed a good or a bad deal. We --
there was no reason for me to say "a good deal." 
(Tr. p. 63; testimony of Lowenberg.) 
From the record one cannot find any form of 
corroborated representation at all to Lowenberg that the offer 
to lease was contingent upon the sale to the Fiber Science 
people. While it is undisputed that the Fiber Science people 
did have an interest in participating in the purchase of the 
property, all of the witnesses except Lowenberg were explicit 
that (1) the participation would be limited, ·{"'2) would be 
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determined in the future, and (3) the lease was independent of 
the sale. (Tr. pp. 128, 207; testimony of Daughtrey; Tr. pp. 
141, 143; testimony of Dunahoo; Tr. pp. 106-107; testimony of 
Heimark.) 
Although Daughtrey was never clearly established as 
appellants' agent, he was definitely never established as 
plaintiffs-respondents representative or agent. Hence 
regardless of whatever appellant Lowenberg claims Daughtrey 
told him, such statements (largely denied by Daughtrey) do not 
in any way constitute representations by plaintiffs-
respondents. Nowhere in any of the testimony were appellants 
successful in attributing directly to plaintiffs-respondents or 
to third-party respondent Dunahoo any statement even closely 
resembling the claim that if the property were not sold, Fiber 
Science would not lease the building. 
In short, appellants have not established a 
misrepresentation by these respondents. That portion of the 
claim missing, their entire claim falls. 
B. There was no Misrepresentation as to a Presently 
Existing Fact. 
The second element outlined in appellants' brief as a 
requirement to sustain their claim is that the representation 
be as to a presently existing fact. Appellants' brief, 
however, incorrectly characterizes the argument made by 
plaintiffs-respondents on that point at trial. It is not 
because the option called for conduct to take place in the 
-10-
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future that these respondents claim that the representation was 
not as to a presently existing fact. Rather, the future 
conduct is based on the understanding and agreement between the 
Fiber Science people and plaintiffs-respondents that the 
determination of the extent of the participation in the 
ownership of the building by the Fiber Science people would 
come at a later date. In other words, plaintiffs-respondents 
were the ones who signed the lease and option and who paid the 
earnest money. The Fiber Science people expected to be able to 
participate but there was no definite agreement as to when they 
would participate or to what extent. As of the day of the 
signing of the lease and option by Cerritos Trucking, Dunahoo 
indicated that there was no confirmed committment by any of the 
Fiber Science that they would in fact purchase nor was there 
any percentage set as to the amount in which they would 
participate. The only thing they knew was that plaintiffs-res-
pondents were willing to let them participate up to fifty 
percent (50%) but that based on their financial capability at 
that time they would only be able to participate up to about 
twenty five percent (25%). (Tr. p. 143; testimony of Dunahoo.) 
Heimark also testified similarly, stating that as of 
that date he did not know who all the participants would be, 
much less the amount of participation. (Tr. p. 107; testimony 
of Heimark.) Hence the participation, by whom, and to what 
extent was a matter set for the future and was not decided 
either at the time of the alleged misrepresentation or by_ the 
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time the option and lease agreement had been signed by 
plaintiffs-respondents. The participation issue had nothing to 
do with exercising of the option, particularly since it was 
determined by the Fiber Science people prior to the exercising 
of the option that the Fiber Science people could not 
participate at all in the purchase of the building in question. 
c. The Representation was not False at the Time it was 
Given. 
A claim based on a promise of future events which at 
the time it was made was true, or was reasonably expected to be 
true, is not actionable when it is later determined not to be 
true. Thus in Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608 
F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979) rehearing, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 
1980), the court stated: 
A promise of future action or a prediction of future 
events does not, standing alone, constitute the 
necessary false representation of an existing fact for 
common law fraud. 
As further stated in the case of Miller v. Premier Corp., 
608 F.2d 973 (4th Cir: 1979) the court held: 
A false prediction or a promise of future events 
generally cannot be a basis for fraud because it is 
not a representation, there is no right to rely on it, 
and it is not false when made • 
At the time of the negotiations and at the time of the 
signing of the lease and option agreement, respondent Dunahoo 
gave testimony that he had a reasonable basis to believe that 
he could participate in the purchase of the said property. His 
testimony, uncontradicted by appellants, is as follows: 
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Q. All right. Now, you were the president of Fiber 
Science at this tirae, as you have earlier 
testified. \·lhat made you believe that you could 
participate in the ownership of the building that 
was being _leased to your own company? 
A. My understanding of the corpor~te policy was if 
it were an arms length deal that it would be 
satisfactory to be involved in such an 
arrangement. 
Q. Did you believe that this was an arms length deal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On what basis? 
A. Because we had negotiated a lease with Cerritos 
Trucking that was less than was being requested 
for the building originally. 
(Tr. pp. 143-144; testimony of Dunahoo) 
In a case cited by appellants in their brief, this. 
Court likewise has held that representations or statements of 
future acts or conduct constitute actionable misrepresentation, 
only if the intent of the one making the representations at the 
time they were given was different than represented. Berkeley 
Bank for Coops. v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980). Thus in 
accord with that case, appellants had to prove "fraudulent 
intention" not to perform in the future existing on the part of 
respondents at the time the claimed misrepresentation was made. 
The fact that there was a subsequent decision by the 
parent company of Fiber Science that the Fiber Science people 
could not participate in the purchase of the building does not 
change the fact that up to that time the officers of Fiber 
Science had good reason to believe they couid participate in 
the purchase of the property in question. Hence there was no 
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misrepresentation in the statement made by Daughtrey to 
Lowenberg that the Fiber Science officers wanted to participate 
in the purchase of the building. 
o. The Representation to Lowenberg was not Material. 
If the parties to a transaction are essentially 
strangers, a statement that other strangers will also 
participate in the purchase can hardly be said to be material 
to the sale. As noted above, appellant Lowenberg admitted that 
he hardly knew the Fiber Science people. The offer to purchase 
that came to him in the form of an earnest money agreement was 
signed by Cerritos Trucking. The checks that were paid to him 
were signed by Fleming and Heimark. Nowhere did he see 
respondent Dunahoo's name. Nowhere did he see any written 
reference to the Fiber Science officers particpating in the 
purchase of the property. The option and lease agreements were 
made with Cerritos Trucking and its assigns without 
reservation. There was no mention in any of those documents of 
the Fiber Science people, either individually or as a group. 
Lowenberg insisted on receiving financial data from Cerritos 
Trucking and its parent Triangle Distributing. However, 
similar requests were not made for financial data from the 
Fiber Science people. The testimony on this point went as 
follows: 
Q. Prior to the April 28, 1978 visit, had you given 
any financial information to Mr. Lowenberg on 
behalf of Cerritos Trucking and Triangle 
Distributing'? 
-14-
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A. Once we basically concluded negotiations with 
Cerritos and Utah Venture No. 1, which is Mr. 
Lowenberg, he did not know anything about the 
Company at all, so he wanted some financial 
statenents to be sure that they could afford the 
lease payment. 
Q. Did he ask for any financial statements from Mr. 
Dunahoo? 
A. No, he did not. 
(Tr. p. 113; testimony of Daughtrey.) 
Considering the information requested by appellant 
Lowenberg of plaintiffs-respondents and not of the Fiber 
Science people, considering the paucity of information about 
the Fiber Science people which lay before appellant Lowenberg 
at the time of the execution of the lease and option 
agreements, and considering the failure to have any writing 
confirmining or limiting the participation in the purchase, the 
trial court was fully justified in determining that the element 
of materiality of the representation was missing in this case. 
E. Lowenberg did not reasonably rely on the representation. 
From all standards there was nothing reasonable about 
appellant Lowenberg's claim that he relied on statements made 
to him by Daughtrey that the Fiber Science people would 
participate in the purchase of the property and that he 
conditioned his sale of the property upon that event occuring. 
However, Lowenberg is not the orginary seller. Lowenberg was 
and is an experienced realtor and developer. He was not the 
country boy taken in by big city fast talkers. He had his own 
San Francisco legal counsel to assist him. In fact, they were 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the ones who drafted the option agreement and who reviewed all 
of the documents prior to their being signed by appellant 
Lowenberg. (Tr. p. 29; testimony of Lowenberg.) 
Appellant Lowenberg did not avail himself of the 
opportunity to confirm directly with the Fiber Science people 
that they would in fact participate in the purchase of the 
property. He made no safeguards assuring himself that Cerritos 
Trucking Company would be used only as a "vehicle" to acquire 
the property. He allowed the option to be assignable freely, 
as evidenced by the option document itself. (See Ex. lP.) He 
hardly knew the Fiber Science people. Claimed representations 
made by a real estate agent who was not an employee of either 
Fiber Science or Cerritos Trucking, or employed or associated 
by or with any of the principals of the same, were not tested 
or challenged by appellants. 
The testimony is that in January, 1979, Lowenberg was 
definitely told that the Fiber Science people would not 
participate in the pu~chase of the first building. Lowenberg 
himself admitted that at least by early February, 1979, he knew 
that the Fiber Science people would not participate in the 
first building. (Tr. p. 219; testimony of Lowenberg.) Yet he 
allowed Cerrito~ Trucking to place its money in escrow the last 
day of February, 1979, and signed a warranty deed conveying the 
property to plaintiffs-respondents dated February 27, 1979. It 
was only at the very end of March, 1979, that he sent his 
recision letter. None of that conduct on the part of the 
-16-
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average seller, much less an experienced.seller such as 
appellant Lowenberg, shows any reliance on the claimed 
representation as the sole basis for selling the property in 
question. The court was therefore fully justified in 
determining that the re~iance claimed by appellant Lowenberg 
was in fact unreasonable. 
F. There was no negligent representation to Lowenberg 
that the Fiber Science people would own or participate in the 
ownership of the property in question. 
In one of the leading cases on the subject of 
negligent misrepresentation, the court in Ellis v. Hale, 13 
Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 {1962) noted that negligent 
misrepresentation can only lie "when there is a special duty of 
care running from the representer to the representee." 
Aside from the argument, stated above, that the Fiber Science 
people had a reasonable basis to believe they could in some way 
participate in the ownership of the property in question, there 
is absolutely no evidence showing any type of a special 
relationship running from either plaintiffs-respondents or from 
third-party defendant-respondent Dunahoo to appellants or to 
any of them. As made clear even by testimony of appellant 
Lowenberg, the parties hardly knew each other. In fact, at one 
point in his testimony appellant Lowenberg could not determine 
whether he had even met any of plaintiffs-respondents prior to 
the execution of the lease and option agreements. 
61-62; testimony of Lowenberg.) 
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Even in the recently decided case of Dugan v. Jones, 
565 P.2d 63 (Utah 1980) the Ellis v. Hale language is cited 
with approval. The court in that case also cited the latest 
version of Section 552 of the Restatement of Torts second. The 
language of Section 552, apparently cited with approval in 
appellants' brief, however gives no comfort to appellants. To 
prevail under that language would require evidence that 
plaintiffs-respondents were the ones who supplied the incorrect 
information, that it was supplied for the guidance of appellant 
in making his business decision, that it was false when given, 
and that plaintiffs-respondents failed to exercise reasonable 
care or confidence in obtaining or communicating their 
information. The record does not reflect any evidence of 
appelants having met those requirements. Hence, the trial 
court was justified in determining that evidence of negligent 
misrepresentation was missing. 
G. Appellants have established no evidence of damage 
based on the claim of misrepresentation. 
Possibly the most important element of all of 
appellants' claim, that of damages, is totally missing. It is 
true that the appraiser for appellants testified that the value 
of the property in question at the time of the issuance of the 
option could have been worth more than the option price. That 
fact by itself, however, does not in any way establish 
damages. As pointed out above, Appellant Lowenberg did not 
even tell the Fiber Science people that he was conferring upon 
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them a special benefit with regard to the price. Appellant 
r,owenberg also testified that his purpose in selling to the 
Fiber Science people was to curry their good favor because this 
~as his first project in the area. He was looking to Fiber 
science to potentially lease even additional space from him. 
The testimony of Lowenberg in this regard is most instructive 
Q. You wanted somebody to start out your first 
building, to be your first tenant? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. But Fiber Science was not prepared to take your 
whole first building; isn't that correct? 
A. At that point in time, no. 
Q. All right. And isn't it true Mr. Lowenberg, that 
since that time you had a long relationship with 
Fiber Science and have been able to lease them 
additional space in other buildings? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so that that expectation that you had hoped 
for has been met; is that not correct? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. p. 222; testimony of Lowenberg.) 
Appellant Lowenberg thus made it clear that the 
"concession" to sell the building and the "favorable" price 
stated in the option agreement were based solely on the 
business consideration that the Fiber Science people would 
thereby be induced to be good tenants and lease additional 
space from him. The result he was seeking has happened; there 
is no evidence of any damage whatsoever to appellants. All 
expectations have been met. 
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Ironically, despite the lawsuit in question, appellant 
Lowenberg claims he still has a good relationship with 
respondent Dunahoo: 
Q. Now, you testified that you think highly of Fiber 
-- of Fiber Science; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you think highly of the Fiber Science 
officers -- ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. --Is that correct? Mr. Dunahoo is an officer of 
Fiber Science; isn't he? 
A. I know that. 
Q. Mr. Lowenberg, you have sued him in this action 
for fraud? 
A. I did. 
Q. In your own thinking is that not inconsistent 
with your high regard for him, charging him with 
fraud on one hand and holding him in high esteem 
on the other? 
A. Not at all. I consider him to be a very fine 
tenant, and as far as the tenancy relationship 
between Ben [sic] and me is concerned its been 
impeccable. 
Q. They have been good tenants? 
A. No question. 
(Tr. pp. 224-225; testimony of Lowenberg) 
In addition to establishing that appellants have 
received everything which they expected out of the sale of the 
property, the above conversation reflects the goodwill of the 
Fiber Science people. They were not allowed to participate in 
the purchase of the building by their parent company. The 
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president of Fiber Science has been sued in this action. 
Despite all of that, they are not only good tenants but have 
increased the size of their leasehold space with appellant 
Lowenbcrg. Thus there is no evidence of damages by reason of 
the claimed misrepresentation. The trial court was fully 
justified in ruling against appellants. 
In summary of the above points A through G, appellants 
have failed to provide any real evidence on the critical 
elements which appellants have to prove in order to prevail on 
their claim of misrepresentation. In fact, the absence of any 
one of the elements is sufficient to deny appellants relief, 
and they have failed to meet any of the necessary elements,· 
namely: (1) That there was a representation; (2) intentionally 
or negligently given; (3) as to a present existing fact; (4) 
which was false when given; (5) which representation was 
material; (6) and appellants reasonably relied on the 
representation; (7) to their injury. Not only is the record 
deficient on each of these elements, but they must be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence as opposed to the preponderance 
of the evidence. Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951 (Utah 
1978). Hence, there was no basis at all to submit the matter 
to the jury. That being the case, the decision of the lower 
court should be sustained by this Court. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANTS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE PAROL 
EVIDENCE RULE AtlD/ OR BY THE S':'ATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Appellants' brief appears to center on the question of 
whether they should have been allowed to rescind the option 
agreement in question. In the complaint and during the trial 
below, however, appellants attempted as an alternate course to 
have the option agreement reformed or modified to require a 
participation or an ownership interest by the Fiber Science 
peiple. However it was never established which of the 
individuals from Fiber Science exactly would participate, if 
they could, and the extent to which they would participate. It 
is thus obvious that it would not be proper for this Court to 
permit a modification or reformation of the agreement to 
include participation of ownership by the Fiber Science people. 
In the event there is any question on the possibility 
of reformation or modification of the agreement it should be 
noted that the pertinent documents in this case are completely 
clear and unambiguous in every respect. They show that the 
lease and the option was made to Cerritos Trucking or its 
~" 
assigns. In fact, the option was assigned to Cerritos 
Associates which is none other than the three principals of 
Cerritos Trucking plus Cerritos Trucking itself. 
(An ironic note to this whole matter is that the 
purpose for the assignment to Cerritos Associates was for tax 
benefits (Tr. p.76; testimony of Heimark.) Yet apparently 
except for that assignment appellants would have been willing 
-22-
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to go through with the whole arrangement. Allegedly it: was 
upon learning that Cerritos Associates did not include the 
Fiber Science people that the attempt to rescind came from 
appellants.) 
This Court has made it clear that parol evidence in 
modification or reformation of ~~mbiguous documents is not 
admissible unless there was a mutual mistake or fraud by the 
other party. See, e.g., Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 
1979) (Citing several other Utah cases on this point). The 
option between appellants and plaintiffs-respondents was clear 
and unambiguous. Hence, any modification or reformation of the 
agreement could not be established by parol evidence unless 
there was fraud by plaintiffs-respondents or a mutual mistake 
betweeen the parties. There was no fraud or misrepresentation 
by plaintiffs-respondents, as fully discussed above. The 
record is also clear that there was no mutual mistake. 
Plaintiffs-respondents were prepared to take the entire 
purchase by themselves and did not in anyway depend on the 
participation of the Fiber Science people. (Tr. p.89; 
testimony of Heimark.) That being the case, parol evidence of 
any type submitted by appellants was not admissable to modify 
or reform the agreement between the parties. 
Applicable provisions of the Utah Statute of Frauds 
would likewise prohibit enforcement of any claimed oral 
agreement eithr between appellants and the Fiber Science people 
or between plaintiffs-respondents and the Fiber Science 
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people. The subject matter of any such agreement would have 
involved the sale of property; thus it cannot be enforced. 
Utah Code Ann. §§25-5-1 et seq. 
POINT III 
THERE \•lAS NO FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED APPELLANTS 
Appellants have argued that plaintiffs-respondents had 
"more than the usual purchaser-seller relationship" with them. 
Appellants Brief, p. 35. The fact is that, if anything, the 
parties had less than the usual buyer-seller relationship. For 
the most part, all dealings were through a third party, Mr. 
Daughtrey. Even at the time of signing the option and lease 
agreements, plaintiffs-respondents were in Los Angeles and 
appellant Lowenberg was in San Francisco. Daughtrey 
transported the agreements between the parties. 
A fiduciary duty may be created by force of law, such 
as in the case of attorney-client or trustee-beneficiary. It 
may also be created by the development of a confidential 
relationship where one party has a valid reason to place a 
special trust in another. Such a relationship, however, is not 
created by mere friendship. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1978). Moreover, this Court had said that a buyer-seller 
relationship by itself does not create a fiduciary duty. Dugan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980); Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 
263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956). 
Appellants have not shown any evidence of the creation 
of a fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs-respondents. In 
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fact it is allegedly because plaintiffs-respondents were not 
appellant Lowenberg's friends that he caused the recission 
letter to go out. (Tr. P· 219; testimony of Lowenberg.) ("I 
decided that I had no obligation whatsoever to sell my building 
to strangers.") 
The relationship between appellants and respondent 
Dunahoo is even less of a fiduciary nature. Dunahoo signed no 
contracts and entered into no contractual relationships of any 
kind with appellants as of the signing of the option and lease 
agreements. As of that date appellants did not even have a 
written offer to purchase or lease the property in question 
from Dunahoo. In fact at that time Dunahoo had met appellant 
Lowenberg at the most only once. (Tr. p. 221; testimony of 
Lowenberg. ) 
It is difficult to perceive on what basis appellants 
would have this Court extend the duties of a fiduciary to cover 
their relationship with these answering respondents. It is 
submitted, however, that the law on fiduciary relationships 
does not extend that far. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR TBE COURT TO HAVE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSimlS OF LAl'l 
Only because it is raised in appellants' brief is it 
necessary to add~ess the question of there being findings of 
fact and conclusio~s of law submitted and signed by the court 
in this case. Respondents do not dispite the fact that where 
there has been a directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed 
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in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
directed verdict was granted. That does not, however, imply 
that findings of fact and conclusions of law should not be 
submitted in the case. The only cases addressing this subject 
are ones in which there was an absence of findings of fact, and 
the Court had to rule on whether the trial court should have in 
fact filed such findings of fact. 
The recent case of Smith v. Thornton, 458, P.2d 870 
(Utah 1969) bears on this matter. There Court said that in 
such a case as the instant case, findings of fact 
"need not" be filed. Nothing was said that findings "should 
not" be filed. It is submitted that the filing of the findings 
of fact is helpful to an appeals court to show what guided the 
trial court in making its decision. Those findings of fact can 
be ignored by this Court if it so desires. However, it seems, 
a bit strong on appellants' part to insist that the findings be 
entirely stricken from the record. They are there and this 
Court can use them as it sees fit. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES 
IN ADDITION TO THOSE AWARDED BELO\"/ 
The option agreement (Ex. lP) specifically provided 
that two months after its exercise, plaintiffs-respondents 
needed to pay only the amount of the mortgage as a lease 
payment until the time of closing. However, upon the mailing 
of the attempted recision letter, appellants demanded that the 
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full amou~t of the lease payments be made. Thereafter, and 
until the time of trial, said additional payments were made. 
The court below awarded judgment to plaintiffs-respondents in 
the amount of the excess payments based on its finding that the 
option agr€ement was validly and properly exercised by 
plaintiffs-respondents and that plaintiffs-respondents were 
entitled to the property. Subsequent to filing the appeal, 
appellants made a new demand they be paid the full amount of 
the lease payments and not simply the amount of the mortgage 
payments. Upon motion, the court below on November 26, 1980 
ordered plaintiffs-respondents to pay the said full amount 
retroactive to the date of the trial. Thereupon 
plaintiffs-respondents did make the lease payments as ordered 
and have thereafter to the present time made payments of the 
full lease amount. This case therefore should be remanded to 
the lower court for a determination of the additional damages 
to which plaintiffs-respondents are entitled as a result of 
making said payments in excess of the mortgage payments since 
ilie time of trial. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Pursuant to the terms of the option agreement, 
plaintiffs-respondents are entitled to attorneys fees incurred 
in seeking to enforce the option. Plaintiffs-respondents have 
now incurred additional attorney's fees as a result of 
defending this appeal. This Court should therefore remand this 
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matter back to the District Court for determination of the 
additional attorney's fees to which plaintiffs-respondents are 
entitled as a result of defending this appe~l. 
SUMMARY 
The main thrust of appellant's claim on appeal is that 
they were induced to sign the option agreement because they 
thought the Fiber Science people were going to end up as the 
ultimate owners of the property in question. Inasmuch as the 
Fiber Science people didn't end up as the owners, appellants 
claim that they can rescind the option agreement. 
The trial court granted the directed verdict in favor 
of respondents and against appellants because appellants failed 
completely to justify their claim. Neither the facts nor the 
law support them. A review of the trial record leaves no doubt 
that the critical elements of appellants' claim were never 
established. There was no basis for the trial court to present 
the case to the jury. That decision should be upheld by this 
Court. 
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The Court should remand this case to the lower court 
for only one purpose: to determine the amount of additional 
damages and attorney's fees plaintiff-respondents are entitled 
to by reason of the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February, 1981. 
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